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CRYING MERCY:
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR
FOURTEEN-YEAR-OLD
OFFENDERS
IN MILLER V. ALABAMA AND
JACKSON V. HOBBS
KATHRYN MCEVILLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s method for defining juveniles’ Eighth
Amendment rights is a lesson in incremental decision-making. Just
1
seven years ago, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that juveniles
2
(those under the age of eighteen) cannot be sentenced to death. And
3
just two years ago, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that juveniles
convicted of non-homicide crimes cannot be sentenced to life without
4
5
6
the possibility of parole. In Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs,
the Court will decide a third related issue: whether fourteen-year-old
offenders convicted of capital murder may be sentenced to life
7
without the possibility of parole.
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Theresa
Newman for her valuable guidance and dedication to my work. I thank Ed Boehme, Kara
Duffle, Claire Fong, Andrew Hand, Allison Jaros, Aaron Johnson, Sarah Naseman, Boris
Rappoport, and Mike Villegiante for their helpful comments and thorough editing.
1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. See id. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”).
3. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
4. See id. at 2034 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”).
5. Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012).
6. Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012).
7. These two cases were argued together before the Supreme Court on March 20, 2012.
See October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012). Mr. Bryan A. Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative represented
both defendants. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Defining the Contours of the
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Seventy-three juvenile offenders are currently serving life
sentences for crimes they committed when they were fourteen years
8
old or younger. Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson are two such
offenders, and they challenge their sentences under the Eighth
9
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court’s decision will turn on what carries more constitutional weight:
the youth of these defendants or the severity of their crimes.
II. FACTS
A. Evan Miller
Evan Miller is currently serving a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for a murder he committed when he was fourteen
years old. On the night of the incident, Miller and his sixteen-year-old
10
friend, Colby Smith, visited Miller’s older neighbor, Cole Cannon.
Miller, Smith, and Cannon smoked marijuana and played drinking
games until Cannon passed out, at which point Miller and Smith stole
11
$300 from Cannon’s wallet. As Miller placed the wallet back into
12
Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat.
13
Miller struck Cannon repeatedly with a baseball bat. Miller then
placed a sheet over Cannon’s head and said, “I am God. I’ve come to
14
15
take your life.” Miller and Smith set fire to Cannon’s trailer, and
16
17
Cannon, conscious but unable to move, died of smoke inhalation.
Eighth
Amendment,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
11,
2011,
4:40
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/scotus-for-law-students-defining-the-contours-of-the-eighthamendment/.
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Miller, No. 10-9646 (citing EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN
PRISON 20 (2007), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf). Since
the publication of this report, a handful of offenders have obtained relief, but a few new
sentences have been imposed. The figure remains relatively constant at just over seventy
people. Id. at 3 n.1.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
10. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9646).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. (noting that Smith saw Cannon “[j]ust laying there” and heard Cannon ask,
“Why are y’all doing this to me?” as they were leaving the burning trailer).
17. See id. at 685 (noting the pathologist’s findings that Cannon died of “inhalation of
products of combustion”).
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Trying Miller as an adult, the Circuit Court of Alabama convicted
18
Miller of capital murder. Under Alabama law, a person convicted of
capital murder must be sentenced to death or life without the
19
possibility of parole. Because Miller was not eligible for the death
20
penalty, the trial court had no choice but to sentence Miller to life
21
without the possibility of parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal
22
Appeals affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence, and the Alabama
23
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
B. Kuntrell Jackson
Kuntrell Jackson is also currently serving a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for a crime he committed when he
was fourteen years old. While walking through a housing project,
24
Jackson and two older boys discussed robbing a video store. On their
way to the store, Jackson discovered that one of the boys, Derrick
25
Shields, was carrying a sawed-off shotgun in his coat sleeve. When
the three boys arrived at the video store, Jackson initially waited
outside the store but entered after Shields pointed his shotgun at the
26
clerk and demanded that she “give up the money.” When the clerk
replied that she had no money, Shields made his demand five or six
27
more times, and each time the clerk refused. After the clerk
28
mentioned calling the police, Shields shot the clerk in the face. All
29
three boys fled without taking any money.

18. Id at 682–83. Miller was eligible for a capital murder conviction because he committed
murder in the course of an arson. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(9) (West 2012). In exchange
for testifying against Miller, Smith pled guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to life with
the possibility of parole. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 7.
19. See § 13A-5-39(1) (defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a defendant
shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole”).
20. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting death sentences against
those who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed).
21. See State v. Miller, No. CC 2006-68, 2006 WL 6627054, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20,
2006) (“[T]he only possible punishment that the defendant may be subjected to is life without
the possibility of parole.”), aff’d, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
548 (2011) (No. 10-9646).
22. Miller, 63 So. 3d at 682.
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 1.
24. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 7 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom.
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
25. Id. at 7–8.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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30

Tried as an adult, Jackson was convicted of capital murder and
31
aggravated robbery. Although Jackson did not personally shoot the
clerk, he was nevertheless eligible for a capital murder conviction
32
under Arkansas’s felony murder statute. The trial court sentenced
33
Jackson to life without the possibility of parole, a mandatory
34
sentence in Arkansas for juveniles convicted of capital murder. Both
35
36
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed
Jackson’s sentence.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Miller and Jackson both assert two constitutional challenges to
their sentences: first, that the Eighth Amendment categorically
prohibits sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to life without the
possibility of parole and, second, that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for juveniles generally. The legal background of the two
challenges is discussed below.
A. Categorical Prohibition under the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment is not static, but rather “draw[s] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
37
progress of a maturing society.” In determining whether the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits a particular sentence against a
38
class of people, the Court applies a two-step analysis. First, the Court
determines whether there is a “national consensus against the
sentencing practice,” looking to legislative enactments and state

30. Id.
31. Id. at 1 (majority opinion).
32. Id. at 8 (Danielsen, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 6 (Brown, J., concurring); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West
2011) (stating that if a defendant is convicted of capital murder and the death penalty is not
sought, then the “trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole”).
35. Jackson v. State, No. CA 02-535, 2003 WL 193412, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003)
aff’d sub nom Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S.
Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
36. Jackson, 2011 Ark. at 1.
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
38. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010) (prohibiting life without
the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
564 (2005) (prohibiting death sentence for all juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 313 (2002) (prohibiting death sentence for mentally handicapped offenders).
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39

practices for guidance. In finding a national consensus, the Court
generally gives greater weight to legislative enactments than to state
40
41
practices, but state practices are nevertheless important. Next, the
Court determines, “in the exercise of its own independent judgment[,]
42
whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.” In
making an independent judgment, the Court considers three factors:
“the culpability of the offenders,” “the severity of the punishment in
question,” and “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves
43
legitimate penological goals.”
In applying this two-step analysis in Graham, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juveniles to
44
life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes. First,
45
the Court found a national consensus against the practice. Although
thirty-nine jurisdictions permitted the sentence, only eleven
46
jurisdictions actually imposed it. Second, the Court found
independent justification for prohibiting the sentence. Regarding the
offenders’ culpability, the Court reasoned that non-homicide juvenile
offenders had “twice diminished moral culpability,” once for their age
47
and again for the non-homicide nature of the crime. Regarding the
severity of the punishment, the Court reasoned that life without the
possibility of parole was the “second most severe penalty permitted
48
by law” and was “especially harsh for a juvenile offender who will on
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison
49
than an adult.” Finally, the Court reasoned that no penological
39. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
40. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))).
41. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (“Actual sentencing practices are an important part of
the Court’s inquiry into consensus.”).
42. Id. at 2022. In making an independent judgment, the court will be “guided by ‘the
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.’” Id. (quoting
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)).
43. Id. at 2026.
44. See id. at 2034 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”).
45. Id. at 2026.
46. See id. at 2023–24 (noting that thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia permit
the sentence and that the federal government permits the sentence for juveniles as young as
thirteen). At the time the Court decided Graham, only 123 juvenile offenders were serving
sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses. Id. at 2024.
47. Id. at 2027.
48. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
49. Id. at 2028.
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goal—including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation—adequately justified life without the possibility of
50
parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.
In finding juveniles less culpable than adults, the Graham Court
relied on three characteristics of juveniles that were relevant in
Roper: (1) juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility;” (2) they “are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;”
51
and (3) their characters are “not as well formed.” A question
remains as to whether juveniles ages fourteen and younger exhibit
these three characteristics to a greater degree, and if so, whether that
makes them a distinct class of offenders eligible for special
52
constitutional protection. Juveniles ages fourteen and younger were
once a distinct class of offenders. At the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted, the common law had established the rebuttable presumption
that juveniles ages fourteen and younger lacked the capacity to
53
commit felonies, which were punishable by death. Juveniles in this
age range remained a distinct class of offenders until Roper, which
54
extended protection against the death penalty to all juveniles.
The Graham Court expressly limited its holding to non-homicide
crimes, noting that “[t]here is a line ‘between homicide and other
55
serious violent offenses against the individual.’” The Court gave
special status to the non-homicide offenders’ state of mind, noting
that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will
be taken are categorically less deserving of punishment than are
56
murderers.”
B. Mandatory Sentencing under the Eighth Amendment
A mandatory sentence is a sentence that a court must impose,
regardless of mitigating circumstances. In both Alabama and
50. Id. at 2030 (“In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.”).
51. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).
52. See discussion infra Part IVA.2 (discussing arguments in favor of finding a categorical
prohibition).
53. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
54. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555–56 (“This case requires us to address . . . whether it is
permissible . . . to execute a juvenile offender who was . . . younger than 18 when he committed
a capital crime. In [Stanford v. Kentucky], a divided Court rejected the proposition that the
Constitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders in this age group.”).
55. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008)).
56. Id.
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Arkansas, the states in which Miller and Jackson were sentenced, life
without the possibility of parole is a mandatory sentence for juvenile
57
offenders convicted of capital murder. While mandatory sentencing
ensures that offenders convicted of the same crime receive the same
punishment, it may nevertheless be cruel and unusual (and thus
unconstitutional) insofar as mitigating circumstances, such as extreme
youth, cannot be considered.
Unlike death sentences, sentences of life without the possibility of
parole can be mandatory, at least for adult offenders. In Harmelin v.
58
Michigan, the Court affirmed a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole for an adult offender, holding that
59
individualized sentencing is required only for death sentences. The
Court found “no comparable [individualized-sentencing] requirement
outside the capital context[] because of the qualitative difference
60
between death and all other penalties.” The death penalty is unique
in “its total irrevocability,” “its rejection of rehabilitation,” and “its
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
61
humanity.” Acknowledging that life without the possibility of parole
can result in extremely long sentences, the Court nevertheless noted
that “even where the difference is greatest, [life without the possibility
62
of parole] cannot be compared with death.”
Graham, however, while not a case about mandatory sentencing,
was decided after Harmelin and stressed the importance of
considering an offender’s age. The Court noted that “[a]n offender’s
age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure
laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all
63
would be flawed.” Merely considering a defendant’s age in the
defendant’s transfer from juvenile court to adult court is potentially
insufficient under Graham, because legislators may not have intended
juvenile offenders to receive the same punishment as adult
64
offenders.
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39(1) (West
2012).
58. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
59. Id. at 996.
60. Id. at 995.
61. Id. at 995–96 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
62. Id. at 996.
63. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).
64. See id. at 2025 (“[T]he fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without
parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many

MCEVILLY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

238

5/3/2012 9:18 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 7

IV. ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION
As in Graham, the Court in Miller and Jackson will likely apply its
two-step analysis to determine whether the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders
convicted of capital murder to life without the possibility of parole.
Arguments for and against this categorical prohibition are discussed
below.
A. Arguments for a Categorical Prohibition
1. National Consensus
The two-step analysis begins with identifying a national consensus.
Although thirty-six states permit sentencing fourteen-year-old
65
offenders to life without the possibility of parole, only eighteen
66
states have ever imposed this sentence, and ten of these states have
67
only imposed it once or twice. Moreover, only seventy-three
offenders are currently serving sentences of life without the
possibility of parole for crimes they committed when they were
68
fourteen years old or younger. This number is remarkably low,
considering that it reflects nearly all juvenile offenders who have
received a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence stretching
69
back many decades.
Evidence of a national consensus against a sentence is “not
undermined” by the fact that most states legislatively allow that
70
sentence. Although thirty-six states allow life without the possibility
States intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.”). Depending on the
state, a juvenile court may transfer a juvenile to the district court in the case of certain major
crimes and where the juvenile is of a certain age. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27318(c)(2)(A), (E), (G) (West 2011) (permitting a fourteen-year-old offender to be transferred to
the district court if he or she committed capital murder, rape, or a terrorist attack). In
determining whether to grant the transfer, the juvenile court generally considers the seriousness
of the crime and the maturity of the offender. See e.g., ALA. CODE. § 12-15-203(d)(1), (5) (2012)
(listing as factors “the nature of the present alleged offense” and “the extent and nature of the
physical and mental maturity of the child”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g)(1), (6) (listing as
factors “the seriousness of the offense” and “the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile”).
65. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9646).
66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (“It becomes all the more clear how rare these
sentences are, even within the jurisdictions that do sometimes impose them, when one considers
that a juvenile sentenced to life without parole is likely to live in prison for decades.”).
70. See id. at 2023, 2025 (finding a national consensus against sentencing juvenile non-
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of parole for fourteen-year-old offenders, in most of these states, the
legislatures never expressly authorize life-without-the-possibility-of71
parole sentences for fourteen-year-old offenders. Rather, legislatures
lower the requirements for transferring juveniles to adult court, and
72
courts then directly charge juveniles as if they were adults. That a
majority of states allow life without the possibility of parole for
fourteen-year-old offenders shows that these states consider these
offenders to be “old enough to be tried in criminal court for serious
crimes (or too old to be dealt with effectively in juvenile court), but
tells us nothing about the judgment these States have made regarding
73
the appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders.”
2. Independent Justification
The two-step analysis concludes with the Court’s “own
74
independent judgment,” which is influenced by the offenders’
culpability, the severity of the sentence, and whether the sentence
75
serves legitimate penological goals.
First, under the Roper standard, fourteen-year-old offenders have
less culpability than other juveniles. Recent scientific research shows
that young juveniles, as compared to older juveniles, are (1) less
76
mature and experience an “increase in reward seeking” at puberty;
(2) more susceptible to peer pressure, which reaches “an all-time high
77
in eighth grade,” particularly in boys; and (3) in earlier stages of
developing their character, giving them a “great[er] capacity for
78
change.”

homicide offenders to life without the possibility of parole despite the fact that thirty-nine
jurisdictions legislatively allowed this sentence).
71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3.
72. See id. (“[S]uch sentences are a byproduct of legislation expanding the susceptibility of
juveniles to adult prosecution.”).
73. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025 (“[T]he fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without
parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many
States intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.”).
74. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
75. Id. at 2026.
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Laurence Steinberg et al.,
Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report, 44
DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008)).
77. Id. at 16 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of
Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 846, 848 (1986)).
78. Id. at 18 (citing, among other sources, Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in
Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009)).
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Second, life without the possibility of parole is too severe a
punishment for fourteen-year-old offenders. While the crime of
murder is especially serious, the punishment in question is very
harsh—this younger subset of juveniles “will on average serve more
years and a greater percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison” than
79
juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen.
Third, no penological goal justifies life without the possibility of
parole for fourteen-year-old offenders. The Court in Graham found
that no penological goal—including retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—justified life without the possibility
80
of parole for non-homicide offenders. As the difference between
homicide and non-homicide offenses can turn on as little as whether a
81
victim survives, and not on the offender’s actions or state of mind,
the only penological goal that is potentially furthered in homicide
82
offenses, but not in many non-homicide offenses, is retribution. A
retribution rationale, however, requires “that a criminal sentence . . .
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
83
offender.” As fourteen-year-old offenders have at least several
characteristics that make them less culpable, their level of culpability
is insufficient to justify a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole based solely on a retribution rationale.
B. Arguments against a Categorical Prohibition
1. No National Consensus
In finding a national consensus, the Court generally gives greater
84
weight to legislative enactments than to state practices. Here, thirtysix states legislatively permit sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders
79. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (noting that life without the possibility of parole is a
harsher sentence for juveniles than for adults).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (“A person is guilty of attempt to commit a
crime if . . . he . . . does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief
that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part.” (emphasis added)).
82. For example, an offender who shoots and misses is theoretically just as culpable and
dangerous as an offender who shoots and connects, so both offenders are in equal need of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But if the shooter’s victim dies, then the victim’s
family and community may demand retribution to a greater extent than if the victim had never
been harmed. Thus, retribution is the only goal that turns in part on the crime’s result, and not
solely on the offender’s conduct or state of mind.
83. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
84. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the
‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country's legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))).
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85

to life without the possibility of parole. Although most of these states
do not expressly authorize this punishment for fourteen-year-old
offenders, the Court presumes that legislators are “aware of existing
86
law when [they] pass[] legislation.” To claim that legislators “do not
know the consequences of their actions in light of the entire legal
framework” would allow courts to invalidate and rewrite any
legislation in accordance with what they believe is a proper legal
87
framework. If the legislators did not intend to sentence fourteenyear-old offenders to life without the possibility of parole, they would
have expressly carved out such an exception, as some state legislators
88
have done.
2. No Independent Justification
No independent justification exists for a categorical prohibition
against sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to life without the
possibility of parole. First, although juveniles have less culpability
given their age, those juveniles who commit homicide offenses lack
the “twice diminished moral culpability” found in Graham because
89
the nature of their crimes is far more serious. Also, same the author
of the research showing diminished culpability in younger juveniles
warned that “[w]hen lawmakers focus on juvenile justice policy, the
distinction between adolescence and adulthood, rather than that
90
between childhood and adolescence, is of primary interest.”
Second, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, while
severe, is proportional to the crime of capital murder. As Chief Justice
Roberts explained in the concurring opinion in Graham, “there is
nothing inherently unconstitutional about imposing sentences of life
without parole on juvenile offenders; rather, the constitutionality of

85. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9646).
86. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (referring to Congress and not
legislators generally).
87. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition at 17–18, Miller v. Alabama, No. 109646 (U.S. June 1, 2011) (“This assumption goes directly counter to this Court’s assumption that
legislatures understand the consequences of the interplay of specific acts with the surrounding
legal landscape.”).
88. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-104(IV) (West 2012) (prohibiting life
without the possibility of parole for any juvenile).
89. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (“The age of the offender and the
nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.”).
90. Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition, supra note 87, at 20–21 (quoting
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 47, 53 (2009)).
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such sentences depends on the particular crimes for which they are
91
imposed.” Focusing on Miller’s crimes, for example, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama noted that “such a sentence is not
92
overly harsh,” especially in light of the “intentional and horrendous
93
crime.”
Third, sentencing a fourteen-year-old offender to life without the
possibility of parole serves at least one penological goal: retribution.
Although this goal is inadequate with respect to non-homicide
94
95
offenders, “death is different.” When a victim dies, the community
generally feels a greater sense of outrage and sadness than if a victim
survives. Retribution can be viewed as providing a service that
ameliorates the suffering of the community and, in particular, the
96
homicide survivors. To rebalance the moral scale, the state imposes
97
the second harshest sentence for one of the worst crimes.
V. ARGUMENTS REGARDING MANDATORY SENTENCING
Should the Court find against a categorical prohibition, then
Miller and Jackson argue in the alternative that juveniles facing life
without the possibility of parole are constitutionally entitled to
individualized sentencing, a right afforded to adults facing the death
98
penalty. In other words, Miller and Jackson argue that a mandatory
sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders
is unconstitutional. Arguments for and against finding such
mandatory sentences unconstitutional are discussed below.
A. Arguments that Mandatory Sentencing is Unconstitutional
In Alabama and Arkansas, when a juvenile is convicted of capital
murder, the juvenile is automatically sentenced to life without the
99
possibility of parole. This mandatory sentencing means that the court

91. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
92. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9646).
93. Id. at 689.
94. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
95. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Marilyn Peterson Amour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal Sanction and
‘Closure’ for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 394 (2007).
97. Miller, 63 So. 3d at 690–91.
98. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“[A]n individualized decision is essential
in capital cases.”).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39(1) (West
2012).
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cannot consider any mitigating circumstances, including the juvenile’s
age. Although the Harmelin Court upheld a mandatory sentence of
life without the possibility of parole, the Graham Court subsequently
stressed the importance of considering a defendant’s age in
sentencing: “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness
100
into account at all would be flawed.” Considering a juvenile’s age in
transferring juveniles to adult court is insufficient under Graham
because legislators may not have intended that all transferred
juveniles receive the same punishment as adults. Legislators may have
simply recognized that some juveniles are “too old to be dealt with
101
effectively in juvenile court.”
Since Graham, several state court judges have expressed concern
about imposing mandatory life sentence on juvenile offenders.
Dissenting in Jackson’s case on appeal, Judge Danielson, joined by
Judge Corbin, stated that he would find Jackson’s sentence
unconstitutional in part because “the circuit court could not consider
the defendant’s age or any other mitigating circumstances—the circuit
court only had jurisdiction to sentence Jackson to life imprisonment
102
without the possibility of parole.” Likewise, in a dissent in State v.
103
Judge Wolff concluded that Missouri’s sentencing
Andrews,
mandate violates the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that “[t]he
imposition of a life sentence without parole—without consideration
of Andrews’ age—fails to ensure that Andrews’ sentence is
104
proportional to his crime.”
B. Arguments that Mandatory Sentencing is Constitutional
The Court has already held that a mandatory sentence of life
without the possibility of parole is constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. In Harmelin, the Court upheld a mandatory sentence of
life without the possibility of parole imposed on an adult offender,
finding that the Eighth Amendment does not require individualized
sentencing or consideration of mitigating circumstances except in
105
death penalty cases. Though the defendant in Harmelin was an
100. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031.
101. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion).
102. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 10–11 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub
nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
103. 329 S.W.3d 369 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
104. Id. at 388 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
105. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (“Our cases creating and clarifying
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adult, the Court noted that even very long sentences of life without
the possibility of parole are different than the death penalty: “[i]n
some cases . . . there will be negligible difference between life without
parole and other sentences of imprisonment . . . . But even where the
106
difference is the greatest, it cannot be compared with death.” At
least one circuit has upheld a mandatory sentence of life without the
107
possibility of parole against a juvenile offender, and no circuit has
108
held that this mandatory sentence is unconstitutional.
V. DISCUSSION
Miller and Jackson’s best hope for relief lies in the Court finding a
categorical prohibition. If the Court applies the two-step analysis in
Miller and Jackson as it did in Graham, then it will likely find that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing fourteen-yearold offenders to life without the possibility of parole. Should the
Court not find a categorical prohibition, however, then Miller and
Jackson might remain in prison for the rest of their natural lives. The
Court will likely uphold mandatory sentences of life without the
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, leaving individualized
sentencing in the realm of public policy.
A. Categorical Prohibition
1. National Consensus
Regarding the first step of the two-step analysis, the Court will
likely find a national consensus against sentencing fourteen-year-old
offenders to life without the possibility of parole. The figures
supporting a national consensus here are similar to the figures in
Graham, which persuaded the Court that “[t]he sentencing practice
109
[then] under consideration [was] exceedingly rare.” At the time
Graham was decided, thirty-nine jurisdictions allowed sentences of
life without the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide
offenders, but only eleven jurisdictions actually imposed the
the ‘individualized capital sentencing doctrine’ have repeatedly suggested that there is no
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties.”).
106. Id. at 996.
107. Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568 (7th Cir. 1995).
108. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition, supra note 87, at 24 (“Miller has
asserted no split on this issue . . . .”).
109. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (finding that the sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders was “exceedingly rare”).
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110

sentence.
Here, thirty-six jurisdictions allow fourteen-year-old
111
offenders to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
112
but only eighteen jurisdictions have actually imposed this sentence.
113
Also, in Graham, 123 offenders were serving the sentence, as
114
compared to only 73 offenders here. Thus, as compared to the
sentence considered in Graham, sentencing fourteen-year-old
offenders to life without the possibility of parole is allowed in fewer
states and has impacted fewer offenders. And although more states
have actually imposed this sentence, ten of these states have imposed
115
it no more than twice. Presented with figures similar to those in
Graham, if not more compelling, the Court will likely find a national
consensus.
2. Independent Justification
Regarding the second step of the two-step analysis, the Court will
likely find an independent justification for a categorical prohibition.
First, fourteen-year-old offenders are less culpable than older
juveniles in the three constitutionally relevant ways described in
116
Roper. Recent scientific research shows that young juveniles, as
compared to older juveniles, are less mature, more susceptible to peer
117
pressure, and in earlier stages of developing their character. With
distinctly lessened culpability, fourteen-year-old offenders may again
be considered a distinct class of offenders, as they were before
118
Roper.
Second, the Court will likely hold that a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole is too severe for fourteen-year-old offenders
convicted of capital murder. While the crime before the Court is more

110. Id. at 2023–24.
111. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9646).
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 20.
113. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
114. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3 (citing EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 20
(2007), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf).
115. Id.
116. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (noting that juveniles are less
culpable than adults because they lack maturity, are susceptible to peer pressure, and have
developing characters); see also supra text accompanying note 51 (listing Roper’s three
characteristics verbatim).
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 15–16, 18.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54 (providing a brief history of the age-fourteen
threshold).
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serious than that in Graham, the punishment before the Court is also
harsher—the class of offenders is younger and thus “will on average
serve more years and a greater percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison”
119
than the juveniles in Graham. At the very least, the severity of the
punishment in light of the crime is comparable to that in Graham,
especially given that the difference between a homicide and a nonhomicide conviction can turn on as little as whether the victim
120
survives.
Third, the Court will likely find that no penological goal justifies
life without the possibility of parole for fourteen-year-old offenders.
Again, the difference between a homicide and a non-homicide
conviction can turn on factors unrelated to the offender’s actions or
state of mind. Because deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
turn on the offender’s actions and state of mind (and not the crime’s
121
result), these goals are just as inadequate as they were in Graham.
To illustrate, the facts of Graham are not very different from the facts
in Jackson, except that the victim in Graham survived. While Graham
and his accomplice were robbing a restaurant, the accomplice struck
the restaurant manager twice in the back of the head with a metal
122
bar. Graham and his accomplice then fled without taking any
123
money. Given that “Jackson’s involvement in the robbery was no
124
more, if not less than, Graham’s involvement,” the Court cannot
justify sentencing Jackson to life without the possibility of parole
while denying the same sentence for Graham, especially while relying
on goals that turn only on the offender’s actions or state of mind.
The only remaining penological goal at issue before the Court,
then, is retribution. Retribution is different from the other three goals
because it is rooted, in part, in the crime’s result. Retribution provides
an avenue for the victim’s family and community to express outrage
and sadness over the crime, so the need for retribution
correspondingly increases or decreases depending upon the crime’s
119. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
120. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing the minimal difference
between homicide and non-homicide crimes with respect to the offender’s actions and state of
mind).
121. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing how deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation turn on the offender’s actions and state of mind rather than on
the crime’s result).
122. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
123. Id.
124. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 10 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom.
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
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125

severity. But because “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
126
culpability of the criminal offender,” retribution cannot stand alone
as an adequate justification. Certainly, the crime before the Court is
more serious than the crime considered in Graham. In Graham, the
127
restaurant manager only needed stitches whereas here, one victim
128
died of smoke inhalation and the other died of a gun wound to the
129
head. But the offenders here were only fourteen at the time of their
wrongdoing and almost certainly less culpable than the older offender
in Graham. This should weigh heavily against any need to exact
retribution. At the very least, the role of retribution is comparable to
its role in Graham, and the Court may safely find that retribution
alone does not adequately justify the sentence.
B. Mandatory Sentencing
Should the Court find against a categorical prohibition, however,
it must then address Miller and Jackson’s argument in the alternative,
that a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole
against juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment. This
argument will likely prove unsuccessful.
The Court has “drawn the line of required individualized
sentencing at capital cases, and [has seen] no basis for extending it
130
further.” The Court has expressly recognized that sentences of life
without the possibility of parole can be very long and has still never
131
required individualized sentencing.
Instead of regarding
individualized sentencing as a constitutional requirement, the Court
has regarded it as a matter of public policy, an issue to be decided by

125. See Amour & Umbreit, supra note 96, at 394 (describing how retribution could be
viewed as “provid[ing] a service that ameliorates suffering for homicide survivors”).
126. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 23 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2028).
127. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
128. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 685 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (noting the pathologist’s
findings that Cannon died of “inhalation of products of combustion”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
548 (2011) (No. 10-9646).
129. Jackson, 2011 Ark. at 8 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
130. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
131. See, e.g., id. (“[E]ven where the difference is the greatest, [life without the possibility of
parole] cannot be compared with death.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)
(“Because a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how
long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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132

the states according to their needs and views. Judge Brown
recognized this deference in his concurring opinion in Jackson, in
which he sought recourse with the General Assembly of Arkansas
133
rather than finding a violation of the Constitution.
The Court may hesitate to further extend Graham’s requirement
that age be taken into account in criminal procedure laws. Graham
was not a case about mandatory sentencing, and this requirement
134
contradicts many cases that are. Moreover, Graham only requires
that criminal procedure laws not “fail to take defendants’
135
youthfulness into account at all.” Taking a defendant’s youthfulness
into account in the transfer from juvenile court to adult court
arguably satisfies this minimal requirement.
While sound public policy reasons exist for granting individualized
sentencing to juveniles facing life without the possibility of parole, the
Court will not likely hold that this is a constitutional requirement,
even for fourteen-year-old offenders. For the state legislators that
choose not to create individual sentencing requirements, the Court
will rely on the fact that, unlike a death sentence, life without the
possibility of parole does not foreclose all avenues for reducing a
sentence, “since there remain the possibilities of retroactive legislative
136
reduction and executive clemency.”
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will likely create a new
categorical prohibition on sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to

132. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (“We recognize that, in noncapital
cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands,
but on public policy enacted into statutes.”); see also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568 (7th
Cir. 1995) (“[W]e live in a world where juvenile offenders are committing violent crimes with
increasing frequency. . . . [Illinois] took an affirmative step toward deterring violent juvenile
offenders in its state . . . . We refuse to substitute our judgment for that of the Illinois
legislature.”).
133. See Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 7 (Brown, J., concurring) (“The General
Assembly should examine this part of the criminal code to determine whether a sentencing
hearing is appropriate before a mandatory sentence of life without parole is imposed on [a
juvenile offender] and when the basis for the conviction is not premeditated murder but felony
murder.”), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
134. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (upholding a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole due to the dissimilarity between this sentence and a death sentence); see
also supra text accompanying notes 105–08 (discussing the facts and holding of Harmelin).
135. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).
136. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996.
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life without the possibility of parole. If it does not, however, then
Miller and Jackson may very well be imprisoned for the rest of their
natural lives. To Miller and Jackson’s detriment, the Court will likely
uphold mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders.
The Court has defined juveniles’ Eighth Amendment rights
through incremental decision-making. What kind of cases can we
expect to come before the Court after Miller and Jackson? An issue
left undecided here is whether juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen also
deserve protection against sentences of life without the possibility of
parole. With a slow but steady shift in national consensus, this issue
will undoubtedly present itself before the Court in time. And in this
way, slowly and step-by-step, the Court will continue to define (or
expand) the boundaries of juveniles’ Eighth Amendments rights.

